Proof-theoretic notions for software maintenance  by Kahle, Reinhard
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 40 (2001)
URL: http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs/volume40.html 14 pages
Proof-theoretic notions for software
maintenance
Reinhard Kahle 1,2
Wilhelm-Schickard-Institut fu¨r Informatik,
Universita¨t Tu¨bingen,
Sand 13, D-72076 Tu¨bingen, Germany
Institut fu¨r Informatik,
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen,
Oettingenstr. 67, D-80538 Mu¨nchen, Germany
Abstract
We discuss proof-theoretic notions as a useful tool to deal with software maintenance
in a formal setting.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the following question:
Let a program P and a formal system F be given such that we can prove a
certain property ϕ(P ) in F . Now we change P into a new program P ′. Is
there any possibility to use information of the proof of ϕ(P ) for a proof of
ϕ(P ′)?
We give an outline how proof-theoretic notions can help to deal with this
question.
One crucial notion is the notion of use in a proof-theoretic setting. We give
suggestions for formal deﬁnitions of such a notion depending on the underlying
calculus. It allows us to control explicitly the parts of a program which are
necessary or suﬃcient for a certain property. In particular, it provides us with
a form of locality. This locality is essential for the possibility to reuse proofs,
or parts of proofs, when a program is changed.
The deﬁnitions are illustrated by some (elementary) examples which show
our approach at work. The examples are taken from logic programming and as
a formal framework we choose a Hilbert-style calculus. However, in principle
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the approach should work for other programming languages and other calculi
in the same manner.
Therefore, we also give a brief overview of formal frameworks for the dif-
ferent programming languages. The paper is ﬁnished by a discussion of limi-
tations, applications and related work.
2 Formal analysis of computer programs
For our purpose we consider computer programs as syntactic object, i.e. as a
piece of text. This is, of course, something diﬀerent than the algorithm [24]
or the (mathematical) function which is implemented by a program. Software
maintenance is analogously understood as the update of a program, i.e. the
change of the program text.
In theoretical computer science there is a standard procedure for the formal
analysis of programs. A programming language S is associated with a formal
framework F . By use of a translation T we can interpret programs of S in
the formal framework F .
Usually F has to contain a ﬁxed part A which describes the computational
behavior of S in general. Then the interpretation T (P ) of a concrete program
P of S is added to A and we prove — or disprove — certain properties, like
termination or correctness, in A ∪ T (P ).
Given a (possible inﬁnite) set of axioms A, on one hand we can look at all
formula ϕ which are derivable from A, i.e. the deductive closure of A, the set
DC(A) := {ϕ | A  ϕ}. On the other hand, we can consider the set of logical
consequences of A, i.e. the set of formulae which hold in all models of A:
LC(A) := {ϕ | A |= ϕ} := {ϕ |M |= A ⇒M |= ϕ}. If we consider ﬁrst order
theories only, the usual completeness result states that both sets are equal:
DC(A) = LC(A). (Here, we have sketched the standard picture only. There
exists a lot of special accounts to particular programming languages using
non-standard derivability notions, like non-monotonic ones, or many valued
models.)
For this reason, the semantics of a program P is often identiﬁed with the
theory DC(A ∪ T (P )) or LC(A ∪ T (P )) associated with it. Let us call this
view the view of programs-as-theories.
But in this view, we give up a lot of structure (or information) which
was provided in the calculation of DC(A ∪ T (P )) or LC(A ∪ T (P )). The
easiest example is the fact that a formula ϕ can have several proofs in the
axiom system A ∪ T (P ), but, obviously, ϕ is contained only once in the set
DC(A ∪ T (P )). It is our goal to make use of such additional structure when
we study software maintenance.
It is quite obvious that there will be changes of a program which do not
aﬀect the proven properties. For instance, one can remove “irrelevant parts”
or replace a part of the program by an “equivalent” one. We will use the addi-
tional structure provided by proofs to make “irrelevancy” and “equivalency”
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explicit. The main concept therefore is the notion of use. If we have
A ∪ T (P )  ϕ
we can ask which axioms of the set A∪T (P ) have really been used in the proof
of ϕ. As mentioned above, there may exist several proofs of ϕ. Therefore, we
have to take the concrete proofs of ϕ into our consideration. But for a given
proof B of ϕ the question which axioms have been used can be deﬁned in
a precise way. In the next section we will discuss some possibilities of such
deﬁnitions.
With a given notion of use, we can deal with software maintenance. Let us
give a more detailed view on the formal treatment of programs. First, we have
programming language S and assume that there is an adequate framework F
in which the computational behavior of S is axiomatized by a set of axioms A.
Now consider a program P of S. Let C1, . . . , Cn be the clauses of P , i.e. the
shortest phrases of P which can be handled separately by a formal framework.
The notion of clauses anticipates the programming language Prolog which
we will use in the examples below. However, for other programming languages
it is clearly possible to divide the program text in parts which can be handled
separately.
For any translation T which translates the program clauses Ci into formu-
lae T (Ci) of F we have A ∪ T (P ) = A ∪ T (C1) ∪ . . . ∪ T (Cn) as associated
axiom system. (In a more rigorous treatment we would have to deal with mul-
tisets since there could be diﬀerent clauses Ci and Cj which result in the same
axiom T (Ci) = T (Cj). To keep the presentation simple we do not do this.
However, there are well-known formal frameworks dealing with multisets, for
instance substructural logics [27] or linear logic [10]. The concepts deﬁned in
this paper can be easily worked out for these frameworks, too.)
Let ϕ(P ) be a property which is provable in A∪T (P ). When we change P
into P ′ by replacing the clause Ci by the clause C ′i, we can ask whether ϕ(P
′)
still holds in A∪T (P ′). But, if T (Ci) was not used in a certain proof of ϕ(P ),
it follows that we can prove ϕ(P ′) by the very same proof in A ∪ T (P ′). The
underlying notions for this argument will be deﬁned precisely in the following
section.
We will ﬁnish this section by addressing an interesting point in the compar-
ison of the proof-theoretic and model-theoretic view. Assuming completeness,
the proof-theoretic derivability and the model-theoretic validity are equivalent:
A |= ϕ ⇔ A  ϕ. However, behind this equivalence there is an important
duality : On the model-theoretic side we prove a universal statement : “For
all models M it holds . . . ” while we have an existential statement on the
proof-theoretic side: “There is a proof B of . . . ”. On the other hand, for the
rejection of a property we have an existential statement in the model-theoretic
framework: “There is a (counter-) model M such that . . . ” while we have on
the proof-theoretic side a negated existential statement which is equivalent to
a an universal one: “There is no proof B of . . . ”.
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In general, it is often easier to deal with a single object than with a class
of objects. Here, that means, for a (positive) property ϕ it is easier to deal
with a witness proof B of ϕ than with a class of models. If you look at
the example above, the proof which does not use T (Ci) is an object which
can be immediately transfered in the context of the program P ′. However,
the relation between the models of A ∪ T (P ) and those of A ∪ T (P ′) could
be arbitrarily complicated. (Of course, this does not mean that it has to be
easier to ﬁnd a proof than to determine a class of models. Also the proof, as an
object, could be much more complex than the description of the models. But
with a given proof we can often deal more easily, in particular, with respect
to the question of used formulae.)
In contrast, if we want to disprove a property, it is, in general, easier
to deal with counter-models than to prove an unprovability statement. Of
course, if we have syntactical completeness, i.e. A  ϕ implies A  ¬ϕ, the
proof-theoretic account has again some advantages. However, in general, we
cannot expect syntactical completeness. Moreover, if we use it, it corrupts
our notion of use of an axiom. This problem is addressed below in the section
about limitations.
3 Proof-theoretic notions
In the general situation we have a given axiom system A containing a particular
axiom α and we know that ϕ is provable from A: A  ϕ. Now we change A
to A′ by replacing α by α′. The question is whether ϕ is derivable from A′,
too and, if so, whether we can use some information from the proof in A or
whether we have to prove it from scratch. For the second part we can ask the
following three more detailed questions:
(i) Was α used in a given proof B of ϕ in A?
(ii) Was α necessary to prove ϕ in A?
(iii) Is α provable in A′?
If the answer to the third question is positive, we can obviously transform the
proof of ϕ in A into a proof of ϕ in A′ by replacing the axiom α — if it occurs
in the proof — by its proof in A.
For the ﬁrst question we have to give a formal explanation of notion of
use. This will be discussed in the following. However, assuming that we have
a notion of use we can already give a precise notion of necessary :
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let an axiom system A be given. We call an axiom α of A
necessary for ϕ, if
(i) There is a proof of ϕ in A: A  ϕ.
(ii) Every proof of ϕ in A uses α.
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The ﬁrst condition is needed to avoid pathological cases. In fact, (here)
we are not interested in necessity for unprovable formulae. But the second
condition should capture our informal intuition of necessity in the case of
provable formulae.
For the deﬁnition of a notion of use we give three suggestions depending
on the underlying calculus.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let B be a proof in a Hilbert-style calculus. Then we say that
α is used in the proof B
if there is a single line
 α
in B.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let B be a proof in a natural deduction calculus. Then we
say that
α is used in the proof B
if α is an open leaf of B.
We could also discuss the more liberal notion where α could be a closed
leaf, too. Since we will restrict ourselves to axioms α in the following, the
given deﬁnition is suﬃcient for our purpose.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Let B be a proof in a sequent calculus. Then we say that
α is used in the proof B
if α is a main formula of a rule applied in B.
It is easy to observe that these three notions are essentially equivalent, if
we restrict ourselves to axioms α in a Hilbert calculus. This fact would be
quite complicated to state as a formal theorem. However, a given proof which
uses the axiom α, can be transformed in a proof of the “same” end-formula
in one of the other calculi which uses α, too.
In the following we will restrict ourselves to the case of Hilbert calculi, cf.
e.g. [29].
Here, we do not give a (philosphical) discussion of the adequacy of these
deﬁnitions but we appeal to the intuitiveness. In the following section we give
some examples how these notions can applied to answer the questions (1)–(3).
4 Examples
Our approach is very general and should be applicable for nearly all program-
ming languages. All we need is for a given programming language S a formal
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framework F and a translation T which allows one to translate programs of
S into axioms of F .
Such frameworks exist for essentially all higher computer languages. There
are even diﬀerent ones for a particular programming language which compete
which each other with respect to complexity, expressivity and also practice
handling. They can even diﬀer in their intention, focusing on the denotational
or operational semantics. But these aspects do not aﬀect our approach. It
works for theories axiomatizing the denotational semantics in the same way
as for the operational semantics. However, often the operational semantics is
more closely related to a proof-theoretic view while the denotational one is
related to a model-theoretic view, cf. e.g. [25]. At the end of this section we
give a brief discussion of formal frameworks given in the literature.
For the concrete examples, a programming language with a logical back-
ground is easier to handle. For this reason, we work with Prolog. Moreover,
since we would like to give an illustration of our proof-theoretic notions only,
we restrict ourselves to the (almost trivial) case of propositional Prolog pro-
grams. But this case is suﬃcient to give a picture of the deﬁned notion and
to show the essential features without need of a complex background theory.
The propositional Prolog programs are built in the well-known way. We
have formal symbols a, b, . . . , for propositional variables. If we use a, b, . . . as
metavariables for propositional variables, a propositional Prolog program
consists of a list of clauses
a :- b1, . . . , bn.
where n ∈ IN . In the case n = 0 we say that a is a fact, otherwise the clauses
are called rules.
As formal framework F we choose a standard Hilbert calculus for propo-
sitional logic, in particular, we have a set A of axioms which allows to derive
all tautologies.
Let us assume that we have an enumeration of the propositional variables in
F such that each formal symbol a of our programming language is associated
uniquely with one propositional variable. Therefore, we can identify both
kinds of variables. Now, T is a function which translates a rule
a :- b1, . . . , bn
into the axiom
b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn → a.
A fact a is interpreted by the axiom a.
Example 4.1 Let P1 be the program consisting of the following three clauses:
b :- a.
a.
c.
6
Kahle
The set of logical consequences of P1 is the deductive closure starting from
a, b, c: LC(P1) = DC({a, b, c}).
In Prolog we could ask for the goal b:
?- b.
We get the expected answer Yes, since b ∈ LC(P1). On the proof-theoretic
side we have T (P1) = {a→ b, a, c} and we get the following proof of b:
 a
 a→ b
 b
If we choose deﬁnition 3.2 for the notion of use, it follows obviously that
a was used in this proof, but not c. It is even trivial to realize that the given
proof is essentially the only one of b. (Of course, in a Hilbert-style calculus we
get inﬁnitely many other proofs by weakening this proof by adding additional
lines containing derivable formulae and their derivations. However, there is
no proof which does not contain — use — the two given lines). Thus, a is
even necessary for b in P1.
This information will be used when we consider changes of P1.
Example 4.2 Let P2 be the program resulting from P1 by retracting c:
b :- a.
a.
Obviously b is an element of LC(P2). If we look back to the proof of
b ∈ LC(P1) one realizes that c was not used in this proof. Therefore, it can be
transferred literally to the case of P2. The objective of this example is the fact
that, when P2 arises from P1 by retracting c, we need no (new) calculation of
LC(P2) to conclude b ∈ LC(P2).
The retraction of a, however, will change the derivability of b:
Example 4.3 Let P3 be the program resulting from P1 by retracting a:
b :- a.
c.
b is no longer in LC(P3), but this follows already from the fact that a was
necessary for b. Of course, this kind of argument works only, as long as we
retract something. When we add new clauses, there could be a new possibility
to derive b.
Now let us consider the following program:
Example 4.4 Let P4 be the program consisting of the following four clauses:
b :- a.
a.
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c.
b :- c.
If we compare this program with P1 it turns out that the set of logic con-
sequences is the same: LC(P4) = LC(P1) = DC({a, b, c}). But the associated
axiom system is diﬀerent: T (P4) = {a → b, a, c, c → b}. It is exactly this
diﬀerence which is crucial for the analysis of software maintenance. As for P1
we can ask whether b follows from P4, which is obviously the case. But on
the proof-theoretic side this time we have two (essentially diﬀerent) proofs:
 a
 a→ b
 b
 c
 c→ b
 b
Again we can look at the consequence of the retraction of a:
Example 4.5 Let P5 be the program resulting from P4 by retracting a:
b :- a.
c.
b :- c.
Now, b still follows. But this fact can, by no means, be deduced from
LC(P4) alone, since this set is equal to LC(P1). And for P1 the retraction of
a aﬀects the derivability of b. But looking at T (P4) and, in particular, to the
proofs of b we get that b is derivable. The derivability already follows from
the fact that a was not necessary for b, since there is a proof of b which does
not use a.
In a last example let us change P1 by replacing a by a :- c:
Example 4.6 Let P6 be the program resulting from P1 by the replacement
of a by a :- c:
b :- a.
a :- c.
c.
In this case, the knowledge that a was necessary for b cannot be used
directly. In particular, not in the way that the retraction of a disables the
derivation of b. In fact, the addition of a :- c saves the derivability of b. To
see this, we do not need to calculate LC(P6) as a whole. It is enough to show
that the necessary axiom a which was retracted can be derived in the new
context. This follows from the derivation:
 c
 c→ a
 a
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Thus, example 4.6 serves as an example for a positive answer to a question
of the third kind which we have asked at the beginning of section 3.
5 Formal frameworks
We will discuss brieﬂy formal frameworks for the diﬀerent programming lan-
guages. In all these frameworks we can directly work with our notion of use
and necessity.
As a general reference we recommend the second volume of the Handbook of
Theoretical Computer Science [36]. As is generally known, the pioneer formal
approach to programming language was given by Hoare [15], cf. Cousot [6]
which contains an impressive list of more than 400 references.
For imperative languages frameworks of dynamic logic became popular,
because it allows us to express the change of variables in a more natural way
[13,20]. Of course, the dynamic of this logic deals with the program ﬂow
not with changes of a program. But, the main problem with respect to the
questions discussed here is the lack of locality. The change of a program will in
general result in a complete new proof. At least, the study of the consequences
of the change for a given proof in dynamic logic would require a much more
involved analysis of the proof objects.
From a logical point of view, declarative programming languages are of
special interest. There exist several special logical formalisms to deal with
such programming languages. For functional programming languages, like
Scheme, LISP, or ML which are based on the λ-calculus [3], we refer as
an example to the framework of explicit mathematics introduced by Feferman
[8,9,14,32,33]. Studer has even used this framework to deal with the functional
core of the programming language Java [35].
In logic programming which is based on resolution, cf. Apt [2], there are
interesting proof-theoretic approaches by Hallna¨s and Schroeder-Heister [12],
Ja¨ger and Sta¨rk [17], or Elbl [7].
The functional core of arbitrary programming languages is discussed from
a type theoretic point of view by Mitchell [23].
At the moment, the programming language Java is extremely popular.
The development of formal systems to deal with it is still ongoing. As a ﬁrst
reference we suggest the collection edited by Alves-Foss [1]. A recent approach
worked out in all details can be found in the book of Sta¨rk, Schmid, and Bo¨rger
[34].
6 Limitations
Our main task was to show how proof-theoretic notions can help to deal with
questions arising from software maintenance. In this section we discuss some
limitations of our approach. The main one is the requirement of locality. If
the derivability of a formula depends on the system as a whole, our approach
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does not really help.
This is the case, if we think of non monotonic systems. In such a system
the consequences of a change of a program is much harder to control. In logic
programming we face this problem if we work with closed world assumption
or negation as failure.
More generally, every form of metareasoning will aﬀect our approach: the
use of a formula is not only deﬁnable on the basis of a given proof, but it could
be “used” in a meta argument. A (trivial) consequence of this observation is
that we are not allowed to deal with derived rules in the derivations considered.
We would have to store all formulae which are used in the derivation of the
derived rule.
Moreover, as mentioned above, the use of syntactical completeness to derive
a negated property from the underivability of the positive one is also a very
problematic argument, since it remains unclear which formulae are used in
the (meta-)proof of the underivability.
7 Applications
The deﬁned notions are very general and they should be applicable in arbi-
trary contexts as long as we have an appropriate formal framework. However,
for many computer programs the calculation and the bookkeeping of used
formulae would probably be too space and time consuming. Nevertheless, be-
side the conceptual clariﬁcation given by our approach, there are several areas
where it should be applicable directly.
First, we have to mention databases and database update [19]. In database
theory, proof-theoretic accounts are well established. In particular, deductive
databases could be seen as an implementation of the proof-theoretic view of
databases. To control the consequences of an update, our deﬁned notion of
use is obviously relevant.
Another area where our notions are useful is object-oriented programming.
In its pure form it is based on the idea that an object is a black-box for the
programmer who is using it. That means, changes of the implementations
should not aﬀect the bigger program which is using the object. In fact, an
object should be determined by its speciﬁcation only. In practice, a program-
mer has no real chance to check whether and how the speciﬁcation is fulﬁlled.
In particular, he cannot check whether changes in the implementation of the
object will really not aﬀect the bigger program. Again, our approach can help
to control such changes.
As a last, but maybe most important topic we mention proof carrying code.
This very new ﬁeld arises from problems caused by internet programming. If
a browser is allowed to download programs from an other server, it has to
ensure that this program can not do nasty things on the local computer. For
instance, the use of memory has to be restricted to a deﬁned area which the
program is not allowed to leave. For example, the so-called byte code veriﬁer
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should do this for Java applets. It is well-known that, in general, proof search
is much more “expensive” than proof checking. Therefore, the idea is to send
the proof of the correctness of a Java program together with the program
through the net. However, the whole proof could be already too big. So it is a
question of balance which parts of the proof should be packed in the program
in order to get an optimal relation between the size of the transferred code
and the time for the local veriﬁcation. To study these kinds of questions the
analysis of used and necessary parts of proofs is clearly highly relevant.
8 Related work
There is a lot of work related to our approach, both from the conceptual as
well as from the practical point of view.
The splitting of the axioms describing a program in a ﬁxed part for the
programming language and a so-to-say variable part for a concrete program
can be model-theoretically handled by use of modal logic. There, the ﬁxed ax-
ioms would be modeled by necessary axioms. But with exception of database
theory, cf. [21,22], we are not aware of a modal approach to programming
languages which uses this framework for software maintenance or the other
possible applications mentioned above.
The view of programs-as-deductive systems introduced by Hallna¨s and
Schroeder-Heister [12,26], and also adopted by Ja¨ger and Sta¨rk [16,17,30,31],
for the analysis of logic programming starts with a proof-theoretic perspec-
tive, too. Mainly, it emphasizes the usefulness and importance of rules in the
modeling of extensions of logic programming.
As a somehow complementary approach we can consider the approach of
proofs as programs. Here, we extract programs from proofs of the desired spec-
iﬁcation. Thus, the veriﬁcation of an extracted program comes for free. As an
example for an implementation of this approach we refer to Schwichtenberg’s
system Minlog [28,4,5]. There we have a strong correspondence between the
used proof strategies and the resulting programs. In particular, a change of
the proof can result in a diﬀerent program and the extraction procedure gives
some kind of control. One key example for this is the use of an induction on
the proof side which results in a recursion on the algorithmic side.
Within this framework the idea of pruning realizes some aspects of our
aims [11]. Let us assume we have extracted a program from a given proof
which uses case distinctions. New information could result in a reduction of
the possible cases. By using this information systematically, one can prune
the distinctions and end up with a better, i.e. more eﬃcient, program.
Finally, there is already a discussion of the proof-theoretic notions, intro-
duced here, in a logical and in a linguistic context [18].
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